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[ch]Introduction 
[au]Alan McKee 
 
[a]Shit Books 
[fo]When I was much younger than I am today I bought a historical romance novel -- a “bodice 
ripper” -- for my mother’s birthday, knowing that she enjoyed the occasional foray into the 
romantic past. Using all of the fine discrimination at my disposal, as a non-reader of the 
genre, I bought one that looked suitably florid. On the cover, the sky was bloodshot dark and 
a hero who looked like Fabio boasted a flouncey pirate’s shirt and a swooning heroine in his 
arms. 
 
 When she opened the present and saw the book, my mother was suitably delighted. 
But several weeks later I noticed that it was still lying on her bedside table, obviously unread. I 
asked her why. She looked a bit embarrassed, but finally admitted: “That’s not really the kind 
of book I like. That’s shit.” This last was said, not angrily, but apologetically -- the same tone 
of voice in which she described her favorite television soap opera as “shit” when asking the 
family, without any expectation of right, if she could watch that rather than the documentary 
on the other channel. I, looking in from the outside, knowing nothing about the detail of the 
genre, had casually assumed that any bodice ripper was as good as any other -- that these 
texts were completely anonymous and interchangeable, and that their readers would like any 
one as much as any other. I didn’t know -- as my mother evidently did -- that there are rules 
for the genre. There are rules about what makes a good bodice ripper, and what makes a bad 
one. 
 
[a]It All Sounds the Same to Me 
I was young then, but it’s not only young people who make this mistake. The consumption of 
popular culture is going on around us every day. Hundreds of millions of people are 
consuming films, television programs, computer games, pornography, trashy magazines, pop 
music, heavy metal, rap, country and western, crime novels, romances, and hundreds of 
other kinds of culture. And as they do so, they are making judgments about whether they are 
good or bad -- whether this particular T-shirt or skateboard or website is a good T-shirt or 
skateboard or website. The everyday consumption of popular culture involves the use of 
popular aesthetic systems. And yet -- amazingly -- the intellectuals whose job is to understand 
and comment on the cultures in which they live continue to know very little about these 
systems. Indeed, when it comes to understanding how the masses decide what examples of 
popular culture to consume, many intellectuals assume that it is in fact the producers of 
popular culture who make the decision -- that consumers simply accept whatever is offered to 
them.  
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 The reason for this mistake isn’t difficult to understand -- for most intellectuals, popular 
culture is simply not their culture, and they don’t know very much about it. They may know a 
lot about what Theodore Adorno, Stuart Hall, or Harold Bloom say about popular culture -- but 
very little about popular culture itself. The fashionable philosopher Slavoj Žižek, who is taken 
seriously by many intellectuals as a useful thinker on culture, famously wrote a book in which 
he claimed that Star Wars was directed by Steven Spielberg.1 Because they don’t know the 
culture, they don’t see the differences between different television programs, films, trashy 
magazines, or pornographic videos. Like grumpy old men kvetching about rock music, they 
say “It all sounds the same to me” -- not realizing that this tells us more about them than it 
does about the music in question. Television researcher Sonia Livingstone quotes a group of 
academics complaining that: “One would have to have a passion for sameness, amounting to 
mania, if after six years of viewing Coronation Street or Hawaii Five-O one still looked forward 
eagerly to the next episode.”2 She points out that in fact: “Soap operas present a vision of 
endless ‘sameness’ only to a non-viewer: to those who know the programme well, a wide 
range of subtle, complex and historically informed meanings are involved.”3 As anyone who 
regularly watches large amounts of television can tell you, some episodes of soap operas are 
better than others -- and some are standout classics (the Moldavian Massacre in Dynasty; the 
birth of Sonia’s child to Martin in EastEnders; the wedding of Kylie and Jason in Neighbours 
…).  
 
 Some branches of intellectual thought -- the much maligned “cultural studies” for 
example -- have acknowledged that popular aesthetic processes exist.4 And we have recently 
seen researchers begin to explore and report on some of these systems. It is now possible for 
the interested reader to find out how the consumers of popular music decide what is good 
music, and how horror film aficionados engage in processes of aesthetic distinction; how 
baseball fans decide which is the best team; the ways in which television viewers distinguish 
between good and bad sitcoms; how karaoke singers decide which performances are best; 
what rock fans look for in their music; how fans of television science fiction exercise their 
discrimination; the criteria for deciding what is good graffiti; and what the consumers of soft-
core porn value in their videos.5 But there still remain vast areas of popular culture where only 
the expert consumers themselves understand how they are making the distinctions between 
good and bad examples; and outsiders -- including people whose job it is to understand the 
culture around them -- do not even know that these systems exist. 
 
 How do the readers of serial killer fiction decide which books are particularly good? As 
an expert on Internet porn sites, how would you know which ones can safely be dismissed as 
worthless? Why would the cognoscenti refuse Britney the title of best pop princess? Welcome 
to Beautiful Things in Popular Culture. The aim of this book is to bring together a collection of 
experts in various areas of popular culture, and have them explain -- through the medium of 
“the best” example in their area of expertise -- just how these popular aesthetic systems work. 
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The chapters have been chosen to try to offer a wide range of different kinds of popular 
culture -- literature (Thomas, Turnbull, Jenkins, Brooker), the visual arts (Jenkins, Brooker, 
Banks), music (Frith, Brennan), design (McLelland, Banks), material culture (Henderson, 
Gould), performance (McLaughlin, Brennan) and drama (Gwenllian-Jones, Hartley, Banks). 
[Is it worth including chapter numbers as further guidance here? – I wouldn’t. The idea is 
simply to give some idea of the range of the book, rather than a reading guide] Of course this 
collection cannot be exhaustive. There is much, much more to learn about popular culture 
than there is about high culture, simply because the area of popular culture is massively 
larger than high. The number of texts being produced and circulated in popular films, 
television, magazines, novels, computer games, music, and every other medium is many 
orders of magnitude greater -- thousands, perhaps even hundreds of thousands of times 
greater -- than that area of human endeavor that rejoices in the title of “high culture.” And as 
the respected music critic and academic Simon Frith (who has contributed an account of “the 
best disco record” for this collection) has pointed out, even within a single area of popular 
culture there are many different evaluative systems, employed by the people who make it, the 
people who distribute it, and the people who consume it, taking account of different genres 
and historical traditions, and focusing on different aspects of the texts.6 This collection does 
not even pretend to be representative -- but hopefully the range of topics covered is, at least, 
indicative of the wide variety of kinds of production that we can bring under the title of 
“popular culture”; and shows that across these areas, aesthetic systems for judging their 
worth are in play. 
 
[a]Whatever They’re Given 
[fo]But why does any of this matter? Who really cares how consumers of Batman comics work 
out which is the best story -- or even if they do so in the first place?  
 
 The answer is simple. On the left and the right of intellectual politics -- and continuing 
into wider public debates about “dumbing down,” trashy media, globalization, and media 
ownership -- there is a shared assumption underpinning much intellectual theorizing about 
culture: that the masses cannot distinguish between good and bad culture. They lack the 
faculty for discrimination. They take whatever they are given by the producers of the culture 
machine. 
 
 On the right we have writers like Allan Bloom -- author of The Closing of the American 
Mind -- and Harold Bloom -- who wrote The Western Canon.7 These Blooms (no relation, as 
far as I can tell) seem very grumpyare very grumpy, very old men. [Is it OK do you think to 
publish this? Not too abusive? – changed appropriately] Both received substantial publicity for 
their defense of the “canon” -- “the good old Great Books approach” to teaching culture at 
university.8 Both contend -- and were received sympathetically in the media for their 
contention -- that it is the job of universities to teach students discernment: how to 
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discriminate between good culture (the “canon”) and trash culture (that is, mass culture). If we 
do not do this, they say, culture will fall into “chaos,” “mere anarchy”9 or a “sea of democratic 
relativism.”10 They argue that there are “only a few” people who in any nation who have 
“cultivation”11 or “the discerning spirit.”12 These people are not in the masses. Harold Bloom 
argues that “it seems clear that capital is necessary for the cultivation of aesthetic values. … 
This alliance of sublimity and financial and political power has never ceased, and presumably 
never can or will”; and that “[v]ery few working class readers ever matter in determining the 
survival of texts”13; [please confirm this quote: plural “readers” perhaps? - correct] while Allan 
Bloom condemns the “vulgarities” (vulgarity, OED, “the quality of being usual, ordinary or 
commonplace; an instance of this”) of the world outside the university.14 For the Blooms, it is 
only educated people who are able to distinguish good culture from bad culture: “Lack of 
education simply results in students’ seeking for enlightenment wherever it is readily 
available, without being able to distinguish between the sublime and trash.”15 
 
 But it is not only elitist conservative intellectuals who believe this to be the case. A large 
proportion of left-leaning intellectuals draw on similar assumptions in developing their models 
of culture. The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas is also a popular public intellectual -- 
indeed, he made it into Time magazine’s 2004 list of the top 100 “most powerful and 
influential people in the world,” as one of the most important “scientists and thinkers,” one of 
those whose “words and deeds have an outsize effect on the rest of us.”16 Habermas’s most 
popularly cited book is called The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere; in it he 
argues that the public sphere in Western countries is collapsing back into feudalism because 
of multinational corporate greed. The problem as he sees it is that the producers of popular 
culture have control over what is consumed. He says that the masses who consume popular 
culture have an: “inarticulate readiness to assent” to whatever culture they are offered.17 His 
belief is that working-class audiences are “intellectually lazy”18 and lack the ability to 
discriminate between good and bad culture, “because under the pressure of need and 
drudgery, they had neither the leisure nor the opportunity to ‘be concerned with things that do 
not have an immediate bearing on their physical needs’.”19 “The part of consumer strata with 
relatively little education” tend to like “relaxation and entertainment.”20 But it is the job of 
education to provide “guidance of an enlarged public towards the appreciation of a culture 
undamaged in its substance.”21  
 
 It is true that the right and left wings of intellectual politics disagree on just why the 
masses need to learn to appreciate high culture. On the right it is argued either that high 
culture is simply better, in a transcendental way, than popular culture; or that its consumption 
shapes consumers into being better, more moral citizens. On the left it is argued that art, 
unlike popular culture, challenges the status quo and leads people to think for themselves, 
thus having politically progressive effects. But on both political sides of the intellectual 
spectrum there is agreement on this fundamental issue: that the masses consume 
 5 
  
indiscriminately. The fact that they choose to consume trash is taken as all the evidence that 
is needed to prove that they lack the ability to distinguish between good and bad culture.  
 
 This assumption isn’t limited to writing within universities. As noted above, 
commentators like Harold Bloom and Jürgen Habermas are public intellectuals. And the idea 
that the consumers of popular culture are indiscriminate also informs many public debates 
about culture. In worries about globalization, media imperialism, media ownership, and 
dumbing down, consumers are always presented as being incapable of making informed 
choices about culture. In these debates, it is always the media owners, producers, and 
transnational companies who are held to be responsible for negative changes to culture. It is 
very rare for commentators to acknowledge that consumers might be playing a part in -- or 
even driving -- these changes, by the choices they make about what to consume. 
 
 The belief that consumers of mass culture lack the ability for discernment is often 
articulated in public debates by writers contending that they will take “whatever they’re given”: 
“Most Americans feed on whatever they are given at the trough of ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, 
Fox and newspapers that are by and large owned by the same companies”; “Kids will suck up 
whatever they are given”; “Most of America is all too eager to accept whatever they are 
given”; “The one-way character of broadcast media … encourages passivity, receptivity, 
inaction … [and consumers] learn how to be better passive recipients of whatever they’re 
given.”22 If we believe that consumers are indiscriminate, that they don’t make informed and 
intelligent choices between different trashy television programs, pornography, pop songs, or 
comic books, then we can blame everything about the changing media on the producers -- for 
after all, it is they who give the consumers “whatever they’re given.” 
 
[a]Savvy and Discerning 
[fo]The odd thing is that the only people who believe that the consumers of popular culture 
are indiscriminate are those who are ignorant about the area. Whenever writers do research 
into everyday consumption practices, they discover -- without exception -- that the practices of 
everyday consumptionthey involve discrimination, decision-making, and the application and 
assessment of many competing criteria. The anthropologist Daniel Miller studied the culture of 
grocery shoppers in London, finding out -- among other things -- how consumers made their 
decisions about which material goods to buy. He was not specifically studying the use of 
aesthetic criteria; but his analysis of everyday purchasing decisions (groceries) shows that 
even the most quotidian moments of consumption involve complex decisions about what is a 
good product and what is a bad product. He spent a year working with 76 families, watching 
what they bought in supermarkets, listening to them talk about why they bought what they did, 
and spending time in their houses watching how those provisions were used. Grocery buying 
is a massively important part of consumer society. Few people buy Porsches, but everybody 
needs food and drink on a daily basis. The common view of shoppers who buy junk food and 
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heavily advertised household brands is that they see the adverts for these products and then 
reflexively go and buy what they see. We pay little attention to the complex intellectual 
choices involved in choosing one brand of meat pie over another. But Miller found that the 
housewives and other women who still make up the majority of grocery shoppers make 
complicated decisions about what to buy based on who they are buying for (husbands, 
children, other relatives), what official authorities say these people should be eating (healthy 
foods, of course), what these people will actually eat when it’s put in front of them, the 
relationships they have with these people (trying to make them happy and show them love, 
sometimes trying to influence and change them), the messages that advertisers have 
circulated around products, and the question of “quality” -- whether a more expensive product 
might, in the long run, prove cheaper if it is better made and will last longer.23  
 
 Everyday purchasing decisions involve complex intellectual work. Aesthetic criteria play 
their part in making these decisions -- and not just for highly educated, middle-aged American 
professors of literary studies. The journalist Alexis Petridis spent an afternoon with a 9-year-
old girl who loves pop music -- perhaps the ultimate icon of the helpless consumer in thrall to 
the decision-making of multinational corporations -- and found that even here, consumption is 
never indiscriminate: 
 
[ex] 
Olivia is nine years old and she loves pop. These days, troubled music journalists spend a lot 
of their time clutching their brows in despair and demanding to know who buys all these 
dreadful, anodyne, manufactured pop singles … Olivia does … I have given her 20 pounds, 
let her loose in HMV and told her to buy what she wants … [A] lot of older music fans … like 
to believe that your average pre-teen fan is devoid of musical taste, susceptible to the most 
basic advertising techniques and incapable of making a considered choice about what music 
they like … Kids will buy anything as long as it’s been on the telly [they say] … But [they] 
haven’t watched Olivia carefully dissecting her morning’s purchases … She’s … savvy and 
discerning … Olivia seems to have eclectic taste, and her opinions about music worked out … 
She prefers Pink to Britney Spears, not because of her hair or clothes, but because “her lyrics 
are better, she sings about different things, about herself and being angry. Britney’s songs are 
all the same as each other” … [Later] she lets out what sounds suspiciously like a cynical 
cackle. I came here expecting to be horrified by the insane caprices of a weenybopper, but, 
frankly, I rather like the cut of Olivia’s jib24 
[/ex] 
 
 When research is done into the decisions involved in the consumption of popular 
culture, it repeatedly shows that these decisions do involve discrimination. By contrast, the 
assumption that consumers of popular culture are indiscriminate seems to rest on the 
following chain of reasoning: these people consume trash; it is not possible that anybody 
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could make an informed decision to choose trash rather than high culture; therefore they are 
not making informed decisions. But this syllogism doesn’t follow. It assumes that it is not 
possible for aesthetic systems to exist against whose criteria trash might be judged as “good” 
culture. And this is wrong. For there do exist just such systems: detailed aesthetic systems by 
which the consumers of popular culture come to decide that Red Dragon is a good serial killer 
novel, while other serial killer novels are less worthwhile; that Michael Jordan is an 
outstanding basketball player; that Brian Michael Bendis stands out for the quality of his 
superhero comic book work.  
 
 How do we know this? We have the research. You have the research -- here in your 
hands, with this guide to Beautiful Things in Popular Culture. Each chapter in this book lays 
out in detail the criteria that can be used to distinguish between good and bad popular culture, 
and shows that connoisseurs are using these in their discussions about their areas of interest. 
Which is not to say that social scientists have it right, and that we can explain consumer 
behavior as a series of rational decisions following straightforward logical rules -- any more 
than we can reduce the history of Shakespeare criticism to a series of diagrams, lists of 
attributes, and statistical processes.25 The creation, discussion, and circulation of these 
popular aesthetic systems are imaginative, unruly acts requiring inspiration, intelligence, and 
occasional bouts of extreme irrationality. Just like any other act of creativity. 
 
 And when we see the creative intellectual work involved in making popular aesthetic 
judgments, it changes the way that we imagine culture working. We can no longer accept that 
popular consumption is indiscriminate. We can no longer believe that consumers will take 
“whatever they are given.” Which means that we cannot argue that consumers have no place 
in explaining important structural changes that we observe in our cultures -- globalization or 
dumbing down, for example. For consumers are making informed decisions about what is 
“good” and “bad” in their preferred areas of popular culture. We must at least acknowledge 
their voices as contributing to the debate about what should be available in culture, what 
kinds of texts should be consumed, and what value those texts bring to the people who 
consume them. Too often we think about computer games, violent television, pornography, 
and even popular music as having “effects” on people. But there is intellectual work involved, 
discriminating work involved, in the choices about which pornography, which pop music, 
which computer games to consume. Consumers do not just do whatever they are told, or buy 
whatever they are offered. 
 
[a]Are We the Masses? 
[fo]Each chapter in this collection is written by a connoisseur in the area. Each of them is an 
intellectual -- or so I am claiming, although not all might be happy with the label -- in the sense 
that the writers hold jobs in the “knowledge class” and make their money through the 
intellectual labor of generating and disseminating ideas.26 Most -- though not all -- work as 
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academics, but they’re also journalists, book reviewers, music critics, presidents of fan clubs, 
and judges of prizes. 
 
 These writers are not typical of popular culture consumers -- they’re unusually 
intelligent, articulate, and often very funny. That’s why I asked them to contribute to this 
collection. But at the same time, they are ordinary consumers in the sense that although their 
discriminating consumption of their area of culture might differ in degree from those of other 
consumers, it does not differ in kind. Not all consumers are connoisseurs of every kind of 
culture; but the authors demonstrate that the evaluative systems they are drawing on in 
making their choices about what is best also belong to the wider communities of consumers -- 
not just those who work as intellectuals. For intellectuals have now begun to realize that there 
is no line between them and “the masses”; that the masses “may be just like them”27; or 
indeed, that the masses may even be us. As one media researcher puts it: “Although my 
status as an academic defines me as a member of an elite group … I am at the same time a 
fully paid member of the mass audience.”28 The contributors to this collection are all 
consumers of popular culture at the same time as being outstanding intellectuals.  
 
 They also all understand -- precisely because they know their areas and the ways in 
which popular aesthetic systems are employed in the practices of everyday consumption -- 
that claims about what is “the best” in each area are always provisional. Such claims never 
tell a simple truth -- they are always gambits, claims to power, and to the right to have one’s 
own tastes validated. There is no final agreement among the aficionados of sneakers that the 
Nike Air Max Classic TW is the best sneaker; there will always be experts on Xena: Warrior 
Princess who will argue that Ares is the best villain; while a certain contingent of gay male 
porn connoisseurs will insist that straightcollegemen.com must be acknowledged as the best 
website for men who have sex with men. The claims offered in this book are not objective 
truths. Rather, the authors are playing the game. In every case, the claim that is made for 
“best” is a reasonable one. Other connoisseurs in each area would at least recognize the 
“best,” would realize that it is uncontroversial for an expert in the area to make such a claim, 
and understand the criteria used and the arguments made for it -- even if they do not 
personally agree that this is the absolute best. The authors all know that the question of which 
people are allowed to legitimate their tastes as “the best” is a politicized one.29 The call to the 
authors in this collection was a cheeky one -- to take the methodologies of exegesis and 
appreciation, which are agreed by intellectuals to be acceptable ones when applied to art, and 
to turn them onto vulgar, trashy objects that are not normally granted such a dignity. The 
object of the collection is not to provide a canon which interested students in popular culture 
must learn off by heart (although I personally have found the descriptions of the “beautiful 
things” to be fascinating and convincing). It is rather to give us a glimpse into popular 
aesthetic systems, and how they function in the consumption of mass culture. In most other 
contexts these authors would spend their time deconstructing the social functioning of 
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traditional aesthetic systems; I’m grateful to them for indulging my call to a strategic use of 
them in this collection -- and for playing the game so well.  
 
 Of course, given that my interest is ultimately in the systems of popular aesthetics used 
by consumers in deciding what is good and what is bad culture, I could equally well have put 
together a collection called Absolute Crap in Popular Culture, where aficionados wrote 
excoriating essays describing the very worst examples of their areas of expertise -- “The 
worst romantic comedy” (Forces of Nature, perhaps); or “The worst rapper” (Vanilla Ice?). 
There are two reasons I chose to go with the Beautiful Things instead. First, I don’t think that 
Absolute Crap in Popular Culture is quite as catchy a title; and second, it’s my feeling that 
there’s already quite enough commentary already in circulation that’s keen to focus on the 
worst examples of popular culture -- and not enough looking at the beauty of the best of it. 
 
[a]Guidelines For Their Choices 
[fo]What will happen to our cultures if the masses cease to look to intellectuals for guidance 
about what is good culture and what is bad? Do we necessarily face “chaos” and “anarchy,” a 
“sea of relativism,” as the critics on the right worry? With those on the left, should we be 
concerned that the working classes, if we do not lead them to appreciate art, will be lost to the 
“intellectually lazy” world of popular culture, unable to distinguish for themselves between 
what is valuable and what is worthless? With those who worry about the globalization of the 
media, and about dumbing down, should we be concerned that consumers of popular culture 
will take “whatever they’re given”? 
 
 I am confident that none of these is true. When audiences don’t rely on intellectuals to 
guide them in their cultural consumption, what actually happens is that they engage for 
themselves in detailed debates about what’s good, what’s bad, and how you would make 
these judgments. The consumers of popular culture already have aesthetic systems in place, 
which play a part in the intellectual work involved in making decisions about which trashy 
magazines to buy, which vulgar television programs to view, which dirty websites to visit. We 
may not approve of everything that they consume -- but we can’t leap from that fact to a claim 
that therefore there is no discrimination involved in their choices. Harold Bloom writes, with a 
flourish as though he is making an irrefutable point about the intellectual bankruptcy of those 
who challenge the traditional Western canon: “Batman comics, Mormon theme parks, 
television, movies and rock … where will the social changers find the guidelines for their 
choices?”30 Start on pages XX–XX. You’ll find the answers right here.  
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[take in endnotes 1–30] 
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